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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Keith Austin appeals from his judgment of conviction and challenges the
district court’s order granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude expert testimony
regarding the alcohol concentration in his system at the time he was driving.  Mr. Austin
asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the State’s motion
because the precedent that it relied on did not support its decision.  Alternatively, if this
Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying that precedent,
Mr. Austin asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the State’s
motion because the precedent establishes an unconstitutional prohibition on a
defendant’s right to present a complete defense.  As such, this Court should overrule or
narrow the precedent on which the district court relied.  In the further alternative, if this
Court holds that the precedent does not violate Mr. Austin’s right to present a complete
defense, Mr. Austin argues that the precedent renders Idaho’s driving under the
influence statute overbroad and void for vagueness as applied to this case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2015, Mr. Austin finished his shift as a server in a restaurant at
approximately midnight.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.314, L.5 – p.315, L.10.)1  When he left work, he
drove to a Jackson’s market to buy cigarettes and a beer.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.316, Ls.10-14.)
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently bound volumes.   For
purposes of clarity, the volume containing the motion to suppress hearing held on
October 14, 2015, the pretrial conference held on March 9, 2016, voir dire, opening
statements, jury instructions, and closing arguments will be referred to as “Tr. Vol.1”
The volume containing the pretrial conference held on January 20, 2016, the jury trial,
and sentencing hearing will be referred to as “Tr. Vol.2”
2When he walked into the market, he realized that all he had with him was a $100 bill, so
he got back in his car and drove towards his home because he knew that convenience
stores typically cannot make change for a large bill late at night.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.316, L.15
– p.317, L.2.)  However, since he still needed change, he stopped at a bar across the
street from his apartment and ordered a shot of whiskey and a beer.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.313,
Ls.19-23, p.317, Ls.3-19.)  He was in the bar about ten minutes, and, on his way out
someone he knew bought him another shot, which he drank quickly before he left.
(Tr. Vol.2, p.318, L.2 – p.319, L.10.)  He then drove to a Maverick market that was
about a quarter mile away, so he could buy the cigarettes and beer.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.319,
L.11 – p.320, L.6.)  After that, he drove home.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.320, Ls.7-9.)
As he drove into his apartment complex, Mr. Austin was stopped by Ada County
Sheriff Deputy Richardson for failing to use his turn signal.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.36, L.21 – p.38,
L.4.)  Deputy Richardson said he made the stop at 12:25 a.m.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.175, Ls.20-
25.)  When he approached Mr. Austin’s car, Deputy Richardson said he noticed the
smell of alcohol as he talked with Mr. Austin.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.41, Ls.4-7.)  Therefore, after
speaking with Mr. Austin, Deputy Richardson “called for an assist,” so that he could
perform field sobriety tests.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.43, L.20 – p.44, L.19.)  Deputy Richardson
estimated that it took approximately five or ten minutes for the other deputy to arrive.
(Tr. Vol.2, p.176, Ls.8-19.)  After that deputy arrived, Deputy Richardson asked
Mr. Austin if he had any physical problems that could affect his ability to perform field
sobriety tests.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.178, L.15 – p.180, L.3.)  Mr. Austin said he had gout which
caused him major joint pain.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.180, Ls.4-13.)  During the tests, Mr. Austin
also mentioned several times that his feet and ankles were very painful, so he was
3struggling with the tests.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.181, Ls.4-11; State’s Exhibit 2 at 0:35 – 0:45, 2:30
– 3:15.)  Deputy Richardson testified that, at the conclusion of those tests, he believed
Mr. Austin was impaired and arrested him.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.69, L.23 – p.70, L.14.)
At that point, Deputy Richardson put Mr. Austin in the back of his patrol car for a
fifteen minute “observation period” prior to administering breath tests.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.195,
Ls.2-22.)  After that period—approximately 30 minutes after he was originally stopped—
Mr. Austin gave two breath samples.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.199, Ls.4-14.)  The results of the two
tests showed an alcohol concentration of .085 and .086.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.98, Ls.3-23;
State’s Exhibit 3.)
Mr. Austin was charged by information with operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.  (R., p.40.)  The State charged Mr. Austin under
alternate theories; it alleged that he was driving while under the influence or driving with
an alcohol concentration of .08 or more (a per se violation).  (R., p.41.)  The case was
brought as a felony because Mr. Austin had two previous DUI convictions in Nevada
within the preceding ten years.  (See State’s Exhibits 4 and 5.)  Prior to trial, in response
to the State’s request for discovery, Mr. Austin indicated he would call Dr. Loring Beals
as an expert witness to testify that—because of rising alcohol concentration levels—
Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration when he was driving may have been below .08.
(R., p.99.)  He indicated he would use a process, which considers body weight and
height along with the time alcohol was consumed, to extrapolate the test result back to
the time of driving.  (R., pp.120-21.)
The State then filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony from Dr. Beals
regarding Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration at the time he was driving.  (R., pp.108-
4109.)  In its memorandum in support of the motion, the State noted that Dr. Beals
submitted a letter in which he said that, based on Mr. Austin’s physical characteristics,
he calculated that his alcohol concentration at the time he was driving would have been
approximately .06 to .065 “rising to the higher level by the time he was actually tested a
half hour later.”  (R., p.114.)  The State argued that, under Elias-Cruz v. Idaho
Department of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012), and State v. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho
112 (Ct. App. 2015), evidence of Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration while he was driving
was not relevant.  (R., pp.114-118.)
Mr. Austin opposed the motion and argued that he had a constitutional right to
present a complete defense, that evidence of a defendant’s alcohol concentration at the
time he was driving was relevant, and that his case was distinguishable from Tomlinson
and Elias-Cruz.  (R., pp.119-124.)  Notably, he wrote that the Court of Appeals in
Tomlinson reiterated that the “‘lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to
the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their admissibility.’”  (R., p.123.)  He
went on to argue that “[t]he reason why the lapse of time is relevant is that it goes to the
fundamental issue of the charge: whether the suspect . . . had an alcohol concentration
of .08 or higher at the time of driving.”  (R., p.123.)  He also argued that, because
alcohol concentration at the time of driving is an element of the crime, expert testimony
to that effect is relevant because it has a “tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
. . . .”  (R., p.123.)  Finally, he wrote, “Clearly, such evidence directly goes towards the
fundamental issue of the charge . . . whether or not the defendant had an alcohol
5concentration of .08 or higher at the time he was driving.  (R., p.123 (emphasis in
original).)
At a pretrial conference, the parties discussed the motion.  (See Tr. Vol.1, pp.45-
71.)  The State argued that expert testimony regarding Mr. Austin’s alcohol
concentration at the time he was driving was not relevant because “the standard under
the statute as the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have interpreted it is the BAC at
the time of the test.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.47, Ls.14-21.)  The State went on to say, “The courts
have explicitly stated . . . that the State, in order to present evidence of BAC at trial,
does not need to present any kind of testimony that relates that BAC test back to the
time of driving.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.48, Ls.2-7.)
The district court then asked what would happen if the test was given two days
after the time of driving.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.48, Ls.9-12.)  The State noted that the lapse of
time between driving and taking the test is relevant and can be admitted.  (Tr. Vol.1,
p.48, L.13 – p.49, L.1.)  The district court then asked, “Suppose . . . a defendant was
stopped, charged, and then he had some alcohol and then he was tested.”  (Tr. Vol.1,
p.50, Ls.9-12.)  The district court went on to say that there was a due process issue with
the State’s premise because if there was a proper foundation laid to establish that “the
BAC was less than .08 at the time the defendant was driving, regardless of the fact that
when the test was taken it was over .08, that in effect the statute is preventing the
defendant from establishing or putting on evidence of a valid defense and thereby
depriving him of his due process rights.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.56, L24 – p.57, L.24.)  In
response, the State argued that there was no constitutional right to present irrelevant
evidence, and evidence of Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration when he was driving was
6irrelevant because the State is not required to extrapolate back to the time of driving
under the per se theory.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.57, L.18 – p.58, L.5.)  The district court then
asked if there was a due process analysis in either Elias-Cruz or Tomlinson, and the
State was unsure.2  (Tr. Vol.1, p.58, Ls.6-14.)
Mr. Austin’s counsel made several arguments.  First, he argued that it was not
clear that a rising alcohol concentration defense is irrelevant under Tomlinson because
that statement was made in dicta by the Court of Appeals and was therefore not binding
on the issue.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.58, L.23 – p.59, L.6.)  He then referred to the fact that the
lapse of time between driving and taking the test is relevant because it addressed
whether the driver was “under the influence or over the legal limit at the time of driving.”
(Tr. Vol.1, p.59, Ls.7-15.)  He noted that it made no sense for a court to acknowledge
the relevance of such information but then prevent a person from “drawing that out” with
scientific testimony.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.59, Ls.15-18.)
He also pointed out that the statute very clearly “states that it is the conjunction of
either impairment or . . . alcohol concentration greater than .08 and driving.”  (Tr. Vol.1,
p.59, Ls.19-23.)  He went on to argue that the statute was not “so open-ended that
simply a test within a period of time after driving is criminal conduct.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.59,
Ls.23-25.)  He noted that Nevada had a statute under which a defendant could be
convicted of a per se violation “within a certain time frame of driving,” but Idaho’s
“statute clearly states greater than .08 and driving.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.60, Ls.1-6.)    He then
reiterated that Mr. Austin had a due process right to present a defense to each element
2 In Elias-Cruz, in response to a due process challenge, the Court stated that there was
“no due process violation in excluding irrelevant evidence.” 153 Idaho at 205.
7of the crime charged, and one of those was driving with an alcohol concentration of .08
or higher.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.63, Ls.11-15.)
Subsequently, the district court asked the State whether the statute indicated
when the alcohol concentration test had to be given.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68, Ls.6-7.)  The
State said that there was no requirement for that, and the district court said, “It could be
two days afterwards.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68, L.17.)  The State replied, “Yeah, I mean,
theoretically you could try to prosecute someone—I seriously doubt that any prosecutor
in his right mind would try that.  But . . . there’s no time limit in Idaho.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68,
Ls.18-22.)
The district court did not rule on the motion in limine that day.  It said it was
“leaning” towards a finding that the “the State’s position may impair the defendant’s due
process right to a fair trial and it could be a due process violation.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.69,
Ls.19-24.)  On the first day of trial, however, the district court held that—under the
relevant precedent—evidence of Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration at the time of driving
was irrelevant under the per se theory but had to be admitted under the impairment
theory and thus granted the State’s motion.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.10, L.13 – p.11, L.6, p.28,
Ls.4-15.)
Mr. Austin’s counsel confirmed that “integral to Mr. Austin’s defense to the per se
theory is that he was under the legal limit at the time of driving.  That is the evidence
that we would seek to establish through our expert testimony.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.11, L.25 –
p.12, L.4.)  The district court said, “I understand that . . . and while I personally agree
with . . . the rationale of your thought, I think it’s contrary to the existing case law in
Idaho.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.12, Ls.5-8.)  After more discussion, Mr. Austin’s counsel reiterated
8his concern that he should be able to present extrapolation evidence “under his due
process rights applied to the state under the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.26, Ls.16-25.)  The district court said, “Conceptually, I’ll
agree with you . . . and if I had a blank tablet that I was operating under, I would say,
you know, you’re right.  But the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have ruled on
the issue.  Admittedly I don’t think they ever discussed the due process concept.”
(Tr. Vol.2, p.27, Ls.4-10.)
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Austin guilty.  (R., p.156; Tr. Vol.1, p.282, Ls.9-12.)
However, the jurors were instructed that they did not need to agree on a particular
theory, so there was no indication as to whether he was convicted under the per se
theory or the driving under the influence theory.  (R., pp.144-45; Tr. Vol.1, p.258, L.4 –
p.259, L.6.)  Subsequently, the district court withheld judgment and placed Mr. Austin on
probation for seven years.  (R., pp.161-63.)  Mr. Austin filed a notice of appeal that was
timely from the district court’s order withholding judgment and order of probation.
(R., pp.169-70.)
9ISSUES
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in
limine because it did not apply the relevant precedent correctly and violated
Mr. Austin’s due process right to present a complete defense?
2. Does the dicta in Tomlinson render Idaho Code § 18-8004 overbroad and void
for vagueness as applied?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Motion In Limine
Because It Did Not Interpret Or Apply The Relevant Precedent Correctly, And It Violated
Mr. Austin’s Constitutional Right To Present A Complete Defense
A. Introduction
Idaho’s DUI statute unambiguously states that driving with an alcohol
concentration over the legal limit is unlawful.  Therefore, one element the State must
prove is that the driver’s alcohol concentration be over the legal limit, at the time of
driving.  As due process requires the State to prove every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, scientific evidence regarding Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration when
he was driving was relevant, and Mr. Austin should have been allowed to present that
evidence to rebut the State’s test result evidence and present a complete defense.
B. Standard Of Review
A district court’s decision on a motion in limine is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 527 (2014). A trial court abuses its
discretion unless it “(1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the
boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches
the decision through an exercise of reason.” State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 521, 528
(2013) (citation omitted).
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C. Under The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-8004(1), One Element Of The Prohibited
Conduct is “Driving,” So Evidence Of The Driver’s Condition While Driving Is
Plainly Relevant, And The District Court Did Not Interpret The Relevant
Precedent Correctly
Mr. Austin had a right to present scientific evidence that his alcohol
concentration, when he was driving, was not over the legal limit.  However, despite its
acknowledgment that it “[c]onceptually” agreed that Mr. Austin had a due process right
to present such evidence, the district court held that such evidence was irrelevant under
Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012) and State v.
Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2015), review denied (Oct. 14, 2015).  (See
Tr., Vol.2, p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.12.)3 In this case, given that Elias-Cruz concerned the
margin of error inherent in the machinery used for breath testing, and the Court of
Appeals’ statements in Tomlinson regarding a situation such as the one presented in
this case were erroneous dicta, the district court abused its discretion when it granted
the State’s motion in limine because it did not apply the applicable legal standards or
reach its decision through an exercise of reason.  Alternatively, Tomlinson should be
overruled or narrowed to its facts.
Elias-Cruz and Tomlinson did not remove the element of driving from the driving
under the influence statute.  Indeed, the prohibited conduct is not “submitting to breath
testing when over the limit.”  The statute specifically prohibits driving when over the
limit. Therefore, a conclusion that evidence of a driver’s condition while driving is
3 The district court ruled from the bench on this issue and thus did not issue a written
decision.  However, the arguments put forward by the State focused on these two cases
(See e.g. Tr. Vol.1, p.46, L.14 – p.59, L.6), and a review of the discussions and briefing
on the motion in limine makes it clear that the district court based its decision on this
precedent. (R., pp.114-118).
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irrelevant to his defense is unreasonable and misinterprets precedent.
The conduct prohibited by statute reads as follows: “It is unlawful for any person
who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or
who has an alcohol concentration of .08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or
more, as shown by an analysis of his blood, breath, or urine, to drive or  be  in  actual
physical control of a motor vehicle . . . .”  Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a) (emphasis
added). Clearly, the statute makes driving under the influence illegal.
Similarly, the Idaho pattern jury instructions, approved by this Court in 2010, list
the elements as follows:  (1) On or about a certain date; (2) in the State of Idaho; (3) the
defendant drove or was in actual physical control of; (4) a motor vehicle; (5) upon a
highway, street or bridge or upon public or private property open to the public; (6) while
under the influence of alcohol or while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more
as shown by an analysis of the defendant’s blood, urine, or breath.  (ICJI 1000
(emphasis added).)
Nevertheless, the district court concluded, after Mr. Austin’s counsel argued
“certainly integral to Mr. Austin’s defense to the per se theory is that he was under the
legal limit at the time of driving,” (Tr. Vol.2, p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.4), that the argument
was “contrary to the existing case law in Idaho” because such evidence was irrelevant.
(Tr. Vol.2, p.12, Ls.5-8). This conclusion misinterpreted and misapplied the precedent.
Tomlinson and Elias-Cruz relied on earlier cases that stand for the proposition
that the State does not have to extrapolate back from the time of test results to prove a
per se theory of a violation of the statute—as distinct from the impairment theory, where
the State must provide such evidence if it intends to introduce evidence of alcohol
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concentration to support the impairment charge. See State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523
(1976); State v. Robinette, 141 Idaho 110 (2005).  But it is an illogical, and
unconstitutional, leap to say that because the State is not required to prove something,
the defendant is not even permitted to introduce evidence of it.
Subsection (4) of the statute, which was at issue in Elias-Cruz—and is about the
method and machinery of testing only—cannot be interpreted in such a way as to
swallow up and ignore Subsection (1) of the statute, which criminalizes the conduct of
driving in a certain condition.
Elias-Cruz concerned an argument that evidence regarding the margin of error
inherent to a breath testing machine should not have been excluded.  The case arose
out of an administrative license suspension hearing under I.C. § 18–8002A. Elias-Cruz,
153 Idaho at 201.  An officer suspended Ms. Elias-Cruz’s license after she was pulled
over and submitted to a breathalyzer test, which produced result of .021 and .02. Id.  At
an administrative hearing, she introduced expert testimony regarding the “margin of
error” of the breath testing machine. Id. at 202.  Because of that margin of error, she
argued that her alcohol concentration could have been below the legal limit of .02. Id.
The hearing officer upheld Ms. Elias-Cruz’s suspension because it did not believe she
met her burden of proof under I.C. § 18–8002A(7). Id.  She appealed to the district
court, which reversed, but the Department of Transportation appealed. Id.
This Court reversed, holding that the 1987 amendments to Subsection (4)
rendered evidence about the margin of error in alcohol concentration testing machine
results irrelevant. Id. at 203–04. The Court reached this conclusion because a 1987
amendment to the statute eliminated the need for the State to introduce evidence of the
14
machine’s accuracy when presenting evidence of its testing results. Specifically, the
Court stated:
After the 1987 amendment, a violation can be shown simply by the
results of a test for alcohol concentration that complies with the statutory
requirements.  With that change, the margin of error in the testing
equipment is irrelevant.  The equipment need not precisely measure the
alcohol concentration in the person’s blood.  The test need only be based
upon the correct formula, and the equipment must be properly approved
and certified.
Id. at 204.  The Court went on to discuss Sutliff and Robinette in dicta and wrote, “In
essence, we held that the driver took the risk that the concentration of alcohol in his
blood at the time of testing would be greater than it was when he was actually driving an
hour earlier.” Id. at 205.  In other words, a driver took the risk that the State could get
test results admitted without having to extrapolate back to the time of driving.  However,
the Court did not hold that a driver took the risk that his due process rights would be
violated because he would be barred from presenting his own extrapolation evidence.
Further, the legislative amendment4 concerned the testing method and machinery, and
the issue in Elias-Cruz involved introduction of margin of error evidence.  Here,
Mr. Austin sought to introduce evidence of his condition while driving, not to dispute the
4 The statement of purpose of the amendment read as follows:
 [T]he amendment allows the results of an alcohol test to be introduced
without having to call expert witnesses on behalf of the state.  This
amendment will make the practice uniform around the state, as several
courts have already adopted this rule.  The test results are extremely
reliable and it becomes and economic burden to the state to have to
furnish witnesses to provide superfluous verification.
Statement of Purpose, H.R. 119, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987) (see Appendix A,
p.6) (emphasis added).  Therefore, it is evident that the amendment was, at least in
part, an acknowledgment of this Court’s holding in State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 525
(1976), which is discussed in detail below.
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accuracy of the method of testing.  Therefore, Elias-Cruz is not controlling on the
admissibility of Mr. Austin’s proposed evidence.
However, the Court of Appeals, relying in part on Elias-Cruz, held that a
defendant’s evidence as to his alcohol concentration at the time of driving was also
irrelevant. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at 123.  There, Mr. Tomlinson argued, inter alia, that
the magistrate court erred when it excluded evidence regarding whether his alcohol
concentration was rising between the time he was driving, and the time he submitted to
the breath tests. Id. at 119.  Mr. Tomlinson did not have an expert prepared to testify,
so the Court of Appeals held that “the magistrate did not err in excluding evidence that
Tomlinson did not have available and could not have introduced in any event.” Id. at
122.
Although Tomlinson was decided on its facts, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
wrote in dicta, “However, had Tomlinson retained an expert to discuss extrapolation of
Tomlinson’s breath test results back to the time he was driving, the magistrate still
would not have erred in excluding that evidence.” Id.  It went on to state,
Although evidence of the lapse of time between the stop and the
evidentiary test is relevant to the weight afforded the test results, it does
not necessarily follow that evidence regarding back extrapolation is
relevant to defend against a per se violation of the statute. Indeed, where
the prosecution elects to proceed under a per se theory of liability, the
question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112; State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho
449, 452 (Ct. App. 2013)).  Finally, it wrote,
No Idaho appellate court has ever held, under the post–1987 DUI statute,
that evidence regarding a defendant's alcohol concentration at a time
other than when an evidentiary test was performed is relevant under a per
se theory of liability.  Thus, the alcohol concentration in a defendant's
blood, breath, or urine at the time he or she was driving is irrelevant.
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Id.
This was not only dicta, it was also wrong.  “Stare decisis requires that this Court
follow controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over
time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1,
4-5 (2015) (citation omitted). It is true that the cases Tomlinson relied on stand for the
proposition that the State is not required to extrapolate back to have test results
admitted.  But they most certainly do not stand for the proposition that a defendant is
not allowed to present extrapolation evidence in order to defend himself.  One does not
follow from the other.  Indeed, Tomlinson conflated the evidentiary requirements for the
State with the rights of a defendant.  Removing the requirement that the State provide a
witness to verify the test results does not also remove the requirement that a driver
have an alcohol concentration above the legal limit, while driving, before he can be
convicted of a DUI.
Tomlinson supported the conclusion to its hypothetical by pointing out, “The
State is not required to extrapolate the result of an evidentiary test—whether it be for
blood, breath, or urine—back to a time when the defendant was driving.” Id. at 121-22
(citing Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 203; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112; Sutliff, 97 Idaho at
525). The State’s evidentiary burdens, however, are completely different than a
defendant’s rights to defend himself against the State’s charges.  The cases relied on,
Sutliff and Robinette, address the State’s burdens—that the State does not have to
extrapolate back to the time of driving to have alcohol concentration test results
admitted.  However, Sutliff, Robinette, and Tomlinson all held that the lapse of time
17
between driving and testing is relevant to the defendant’s condition while driving, which
is still the offense. See Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 524; Robinette, 141 Idaho at 113; Tomlinson,
159 Idaho at 122.  Therefore, a defendant is clearly allowed to submit evidence of his
condition at the time of driving by extrapolating back from the time that the test was
taken because if the lapse of time is relevant, then evidence of what occurred—with
respect to a defendant’s alcohol concentration—during that lapse of time is also
relevant.
Sutliff addressed whether test results had to be extrapolated back to the time of
driving in the precursor to I.C. § 18–8004,5 which created a presumption that a driver
was under the influence if he drove with an alcohol concentration of more than .10.
97 Idaho at 524.  Mr. Sutliff argued that the “the possibility that his blood alcohol was
lower at the time of [driving] than at the time of” the testing “rendered the results
inadmissible absent a witness qualified to extrapolate the results back to the time of
[driving].” Id.  The Court disagreed and reasoned that, “[t]he lapse of time prior to the
extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their
admissibility.” Id. at 524.  And it ultimately held that the State was not required to
extrapolate back in order to have the test results admitted.  It wrote, “this statute does
not require extrapolation back but establishes that the percentage of blood alcohol as
shown by chemical analysis relates back to the time of the alleged offense for purposes
of applying the statutory presumption.” Id. at 525.
In Robinette, the defendant argued that his alcohol concentration results should
not have been admitted when the State proceeded under a driving under the influence
5 I.C. § 49–1102.
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theory as opposed to a per se theory.  141 Idaho at 112.  This Court held that the
results are relevant to that theory “only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the
validity of the test result.” Id.  It compared that scenario with the situation in Sutliff and
wrote,
Where the prosecution elects to use the per se method, the question is
what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken.  ‘The lapse
of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded
the test results and not to their admissibility.’  For that reason, it is
appropriate to admit results drawn an hour or more after the alleged
offense without having to actually extrapolate back to the time of the
alleged offense.
Id. at 113.
Therefore, Robinette clearly held that  the reason it is appropriate not to require
the State to extrapolate back in a per se case is because the defendant can present
evidence of the lapse of time between the test and driving.  And if that lapse of time is
relevant to the weight to be afforded the results, then a defendant’s evidence showing
the impact or significance of that lapse of time is also relevant to the weight the jury
should give the test results.
Yet the Tomlinson court wrote, “Although evidence of the lapse of time between
the stop and the evidentiary test is relevant to the weight afforded the test results, it
does not necessarily follow that evidence regarding back extrapolation is relevant to
defend against a per se violation of the statute.”  159 Idaho at 122 (emphasis added)
(citing Robinette, 141 Idaho at 112; Juarez 155 Idaho at 452).  This was an illogical
conclusion.  Because the lapse of time between driving and testing goes to the weight
of the results, then in fact it does “necessarily follow” that back extrapolation evidence is
relevant to a defense focused on the driver’s condition while driving
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In this case, Mr. Austin had an expert prepared to testify.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.26, Ls.1-
20.)  But the district court erroneously relied on dicta in Tomlinson to reach its
conclusion as to the state of the “existing case law in Idaho.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.12, Ls.5-8.)
In State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74 (2013), this Court  held,  “If the statement is not
necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court, it is considered to be
dictum and not controlling.” Tomlinson’s conclusion affirming the magistrate’s exclusion
of the evidence rested on the fact that Mr. Tomlinson did not have an expert prepared to
testify to his condition while driving, and thus further discussion as to facts not before
the court were dicta.  159 Idaho at 122.
Evidence as to Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration at the time he was driving was
relevant to the weight to be afforded the test results because the tests were given long
after he was driving. Evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without he evidence” is relevant.  I.R.E. 401.  Here, one fact that was of
consequence to the determination of the action was what Mr. Austin’s alcohol
concentration was while he was driving.  That is why the lapse of time between when a
defendant drives and when he takes the test is relevant to the weight of test results.
Therefore, expert testimony regarding the effects of that lapse of time, his condition
while driving, is also relevant.
Evidence of the effects of that lapse of time should have been provided to the
jury.  “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
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an opinion or otherwise.” I.R.E. 702. Dr. Beal’s testimony would have assisted the jury
to understand how the lapse of time could affect the test results in light of when
Mr. Austin consumed alcohol and his physical characteristics.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.26, Ls.1-20.)
Indeed, Mr. Austin’s counsel specifically argued that the lapse of time between driving
and taking the test is relevant because it goes to show whether the driver was “under
the influence or over the legal limit at the time of driving.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.59, Ls.7-15.)  He
also argued that it made “no sense” for a court to acknowledge the relevance of such
information but then prevent a person from “drawing that out” with scientific testimony.
(Tr. Vol.1, p.59, Ls.15-18.)
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it relied on distinguishable
precedent and erroneous dicta to grant the State’s motion in limine because it did not
apply the applicable legal standards or reach its decision though an exercise of reason.6
Alternatively, Tomlinson should be overruled because it is manifestly wrong and
overruling it is necessary to remedy continued injustice in the form of due process
violations.  Further, while Elias-Cruz concerned a margin of error issue, to the extent
that it supports the Tomlinson dicta at issue here and holds that the State does not need
to show that a defendant was over the legal limit while driving, it is also manifestly
wrong and should be overruled.
6 The district court’s reliance on Tomlinson also created confusion over the appropriate
jury instructions.  (See Tr. Vol.2, pp.13 – 22.)  Most notably, the district court proposed
adding the following: “Fifth, at the time the defendant drove . . . or at reasonably close
time thereafter the defendant was given an approved and properly administered alcohol
concentration test . . . .”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.15, Ls.6-11.)  Both parties objected to this
instruction, so the district court ultimately did not include the “reasonably close time
thereafter” language.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.17, L.5 – p.20, L.13.)
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D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Motion In
Limine Because Mr. Austin Had A Constitutional Right To Present Scientific
Evidence That The Concentration Of Alcohol In His Blood, While He Was
Driving, Was Not Over The Legal Limit
The district court was concerned that granting the State’s motion in limine would
violate Mr. Austin’s due process right to present a complete defense.  When considering
the State’s motion, it explained,
My basic problem with the State’s premise is the statutes are wonderful,
but I think there is a due process issue in the sense of . . . if the proper
foundation is laid to show that, in fact, the BAC was less than .08 at the
time the defendant was driving, regardless of the fact that when the test
was taken it was over .08, that in effect the statute is preventing the
defendant from establishing or putting on evidence of a valid defense and
thereby depriving him of his due process rights.
(Tr. Vol.1, p.57, Ls.1-11.)7
The district court was right, and it should have denied the State’s motion on
those grounds.  I.C. § 18-8004, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Tomlinson,
and by the district court in this case, violates Mr. Austin’s right to due process because it
denies him the opportunity to put on a complete defense.  I.C. § 18-8004(1) makes it
7 The district court expressed similar concerns throughout its discussions with the
parties on this issue. It asked the prosecutor if there was a due process analysis in
either Elias-Cruz or Tomlinson.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.58, Ls.6-8.)  It said it was “leaning” towards
a finding that the “the State’s position may impair the defendant’s due process right to a
fair trial and it could be a due process violation.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.69, Ls.19-24.)  It said that
it “personally” agreed with Mr. Austin’s position that he had a due process right to
present such evidence, but that that “rationale” was “contrary to the existing case law in
Idaho.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.12, Ls.5-8.)  When Mr. Austin’s counsel reiterated his concern that
he should be able to present extrapolation evidence under his due process rights, the
district court responded, “Conceptually, I’ll agree with you . . . and if I had a blank tablet
that I was operating under, I would say, you know, you’re right.  But the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court have ruled on the issue.  Admittedly I don’t think they
ever discussed the due process concept.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.10.)  Also, in
discussing the precedent, it said, “I know it doesn’t make much sense, but then I didn’t
write the decisions either.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.11, Ls.1-6.)
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clear that one of the elements of the crime of driving under the influence is having an
alcohol concentration over the limit while driving.  And, as discussed above, Tomlinson
therefore misstated the law when it concluded in its hypothetical that expert testimony
offered by the defendant as to his condition while driving is irrelevant and cannot be
used to defend a charge that the statute was violated.  To the extent that Tomlinson
stands for this rule, it should be overruled or narrowed to the facts upon which the case
was actually decided—that it is not error for a magistrate to exclude evidence a
defendant did not have available and could not have introduced.  Indeed, Tomlinson’s
conclusion that a defendant would not be allowed to present evidence of his condition
while driving is flawed and misinterprets precedent.  This led to a violation of
Mr. Austin’s right to due process.
Every defendant has a due process right to present a defense to each element of
the crime of which he is accused.  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the U.S. Constitution provides defendants “‘a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see also U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; ID.
CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (declaring
that “[t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations”).  Limiting the types of
evidence that a defendant presents in his defense may violate the defendant’s right to
due process, compulsory process, and confrontation. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI,
XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 13.
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Further, the United States Supreme Court has “explicitly held” that “the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In Tomlinson the Court of Appeals misapplied, and in doing so inappropriately
extended, Elias-Cruz. Elias-Cruz held that a testing machine’s margin of error was
irrelevant based on amendments to Subsection (4).  153 Idaho at 205-06.  But
Tomlinson extended this to suggest that a defendant’s evidence of his condition while
driving—specifically evidence derived from the lapse of time before testing—is also
irrelevant. This analysis ignores the statute’s “to drive” language because if a
defendant’s evidence as to his condition while driving is irrelevant, then his condition
while driving is apparently now irrelevant.  And if this is true, then the words “to drive”
have been read out of the statute.  This Court has stated that it is incumbent upon
appellate courts to interpret a statute in a way that will not nullify it, and appellate courts
“will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions
included therein.” Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572 (1990) (internal citations
omitted). If the words “to drive” have been read out of the statute, then Mr. Austin has
been denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
The district court—despite acknowledging that the precedent did not “make much
sense”—apparently felt bound by that precedent and relied on Tomlinson’s suggestion
that a defendant’s evidence of his condition while driving is irrelevant. (Tr. Vol.2, p.11,
Ls.1-6.) This was an abuse of discretion because it resulted in a violation of
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Mr. Austin’s due process right to raise a complete defense, which was a misapplication
of applicable legal principles.
II.
The Dicta in Tomlinson Renders Idaho Code § 18-8004 Overbroad And Void For
Vagueness As Applied
Barring Mr. Austin’s ability to present evidence regarding his alcohol
concentration at the time he was driving not only violated Mr. Austin’s right to present a
complete defense.  Indeed, some of the due process discussions regarding the State’s
motion showed how Tomlinson’s interpretation of I.C. § 18-8004 renders the statute
overbroad and void for vagueness as applied to this case.  “The constitutionality of a
statute is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Hart, 135 Idaho
827, 829 (2001) (citations omitted).
This issue was not directly raised below.  However, Mr. Austin asserts that the
issue is preserved because, while the district court did not explicitly hold that the statute
violated due process, Mr. Austin made several arguments to that effect, and the district
court clearly realized that the statute posed due process problems in that it could fail to
provide notice or be arbitrarily enforced.  For example, Mr. Austin’s counsel argued that
the I.C. § 18-8004 was “not so open ended that simply a test within a period of time
after driving is criminal conduct.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.59, Ls.19-25.)   Moreover, the district
court asked what would happen if the test was given days after a defendant was driving,
and it also asked what would happen if “a defendant was stopped, charged, and then he
had some alcohol and then he was tested.”  (See Tr. Vol.1, p.48, L.9 – p.50, L.12.)
These questions revealed its concern about vagueness in particular.  This Court has
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held that when an issue is “argued to or decided by the trial court,” the issue is
preserved. State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998).  Here, the district court realized
the issue was present, and generally seemed to agree with Mr. Austin’s argument, but
apparently felt bound by precedent.
Alternatively, Mr. Austin asserts that the error here is fundamental. An error is
fundamental when it “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest
injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due process.” State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011), quoting State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844
(1992). In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010), this Court held it applies a three-
part test to determine whether an error is fundamental:  (1) whether the alleged error
violates an unwaived constitutional right; (2) whether the error is plain and obvious from
the record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and, (3) whether the defendant can establish that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings.
Here, Mr. Austin never waived his due process rights.  Also, the error is clear
from the record as the district court’s decision to grant the State’s motion was a violation
of Mr. Austin’s due process rights because, under the dicta in Elias-Cruz and
Tomlinson, the statute was rendered overbroad and void for vagueness as applied, and
there was no indication that counsel did not explicitly raise the issue because of some
strategic decision.  And finally, violating Mr. Austin’s due process rights affected the
outcome of the proceedings because it denied him the right to present a defense.
“‘The overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to
prohibit legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally
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protected freedoms.’” State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 423 (2012) (quoting
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 713 (2003).  “The two-part test for unconstitutional
overbreadth asks (1) whether the statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct,
and (2) whether the statute precludes a significant amount of that constitutionally
protected conduct.” Id.  If the answer to both steps is in the affirmative, then the statute
is overbroad. Id.
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001).  This
“doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted).  “The more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principle element of the doctrine –
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.’” Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).  “Where
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a
‘standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections.’” Id. (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575).  “Legislatures may not
so abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.” Goguen,
415 U.S. at 575.  Rather, the “absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or
exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 578 (citation
omitted).  Simply put, a law is void for vagueness when it subjects a person “to criminal
liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury [are] free to react to
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nothing more than their own preferences . . . .” Id.  “In scrutinizing a statute for
intolerable vagueness as applied to specific conduct, courts must ‘take the statute
as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has interpreted it.’”
Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348 (1984) (citations omitted).
As an initial point, Mr. Austin does not argue that the statute is vague on its face
because he asserts that the statute as written allows for a defendant to put on evidence
of his alcohol concentration at the time of driving as it is clear that this is the prohibited
conduct.  Under Tomlinson, however, such evidence is supposedly irrelevant.  159
Idaho at 122.  Based on that interpretation, a defendant could be tested at any time
after driving, and if his alcohol concentration was over the limit, he could be prosecuted
for driving under the influence.  As the district court pointed out, this could be days later.
(Tr. Vol.1, p.68, L.17.)
In Idaho, there is no time limit at which point the test results can no longer be
considered as evidence of the crime.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68, L.21 – p.69, L.2.)  What makes
the statute constitutional is the fact that the lapse of time between driving and when the
test was administered is relevant as to the weight the jury gives the test results.  But if
the defendant is precluded from introducing evidence to educate the jury as to what
occurred during the lapse of time because the test result is all that matters, then the
statute fails to give notice of what the actual crime is because it is not driving with an
alcohol concentration over the legal limit; it is simply testing with an alcohol
concentration over the legal limit.  If a defendant is precluded from presenting such
evidence in his defense—whether that be, as in Mr. Austin’s case, that his alcohol
concentration was rising because he had consumed alcohol right before driving, or a
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defendant who consumed alcohol after driving but before testing—the statute can be
arbitrarily enforced.
Several courts have addressed this issue where the statute at issue allowed for a
DUI conviction if the defendant’s alcohol concentration was over the legal limit within a
certain window of time after driving. See e.g. Com. v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 166 (1996),
disapproved of by Sereika v. State, 955 P.2d 175 (1998); State v. Baker, 720 A.2d
1139, 1141 (Del. 1998).
In Barud, the defendant was stopped and consented to a blood test
approximately 35 minutes after the stop.  681 A.2d at 163.  Prior to trial, he filed a
motion to dismiss the count that relied on the test result and argued that the statute at
issue violated the due process clause. Id.  The trial court held that the statute was
unconstitutional and granted the motion. Id.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated that the issue was whether the DUI statute violated “substantive
due process guarantees . . . .” Id.  Mr. Barud argued that the statute violated his due
process rights because it was void for vagueness, overbroad, and failed to “provide a
rebuttable presumption that the accused’s BAC at the time of testing accurately reflects
their BAC at the time of driving and fails to provide for an affirmative defense requiring
the state to prove that the accused’s BAC was at least .10% at the time of driving.” Id.
at 164.
Prior to beginning its analysis, the court noted that, similar in some ways to
Idaho, Pennsylvania did not require the State to present extrapolation evidence in order
to have test results admitted if the result was significantly above the limit, and “there
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was not a significant lapse of time between when the driver was stopped and when the
blood test was administered.” Id. at 165.
The relevant language of the statute at issue in Barud read as follows:
(a) Offense defined.—A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of any vehicle:
(5) if the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10%
or greater at the time of a chemical test of a sample of the person's breath,
blood or urine, which sample is:
(i) obtained within three hours after the person drove, operated or was in
actual physical control of the vehicle....
(a.1) Defense.—It shall be a defense to a prosecution under subsection
(a)(5) if the person proves by a preponderance of evidence that the
person consumed alcohol after the last instance in which he drove,
operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle and that the
amount of alcohol by weight in his blood would not have exceeded 0.10%
at the time of the test but for such consumption.
 Id. The court held that that the statute was overbroad and void for vagueness. Id. at
166.  It stated, “without requiring any proof that the person actually exceeded the legal
limit of .10% at the time of driving, the statute sweeps unnecessarily broadly into activity
that has not been declared unlawful . . . that is operating a motor vehicle with a BAC
below .10%.” Id.  The court went on to write,
If, for example, a person was operating a motor vehicle with a BAC below
the legal limit and he were pulled over at that time, the evidence could not
sustain a charge for driving under the influence as determined by a blood
alcohol test since his BAC was under the legal limit. However, if that same
person's BAC rises above .10% within three hours after driving, he may
now be prosecuted for driving under the influence of alcohol under the
amendment to the statute in question since the statute eliminates the
requirement that the Commonwealth must establish that the accused
actually exceeded the legal BAC limit at the time of actual operation of the
vehicle.
Id.
The court also found that the statute had the “effect of creating significant
confusion as to exactly what level of alcohol in the blood is prohibited . . . .” Id.  It noted
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that the statute could be interpreted “as creating two situations in which a person could
be prosecuted: either where a person had an actual BAC of .10% at the time of driving .
. . or where a person has a BAC which is somewhere below .10% at the time of driving
but which rises above .10% within three hours after driving . . . .”  It held that this did not
“provide a reasonable standard by which an ordinary person may contemplate their
future conduct” because a citizen could not know when their actions became criminal
conduct. Id.  And it pointed out that the trial court had asked “How can one predict
when and whether a 0.10% alcohol level will be reached within three hours after
driving?” Id. It went on to state that the most “glaring deficiency” of the statute was that
it did not require proof that the defendant’s “blood alcohol level actually exceeded the
legal limit at the time of driving.  Rather, the statute criminalizes a blood alcohol level in
excess of the legal limit up to three hours after the last instance in which the person
operated a motor vehicle and without any regard for the level of intoxication at the time
of operation.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Most instructive with respect to this case, the Barud Court wrote, even with the
defense in Subsection (a.1), the statute failed to provide a way for a defendant to either
rebut the state’s presumption that their alcohol concentration at the time of testing
accurately reflected their concentration while driving or “produce competent evidence
that he or she was below the legal limit at the time of driving (other than consumption
after the fact) thereby requiring the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant’s BAC exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.” Id. (emphasis
added).  The court went on to hold that the statute at issue imposed “absolute liability on
the accused regardless of any evidence to the contrary” because it precluded “the
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admission of competent evidence that an accused’s BAC was actually below the legal
limit at the time of driving.”  Id. (emphasis in original). It wrote, “This is a result we
cannot uphold.” Id.
Similarly, in McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1308-11 (9th Cir. 1992), the court
held that Nevada’s DUI statute was unconstitutional as applied because it created a
“mandatory conclusive presumption” that a driver’s alcohol concentration shown by the
test result was the same as that at the time of driving. Id. at 1310.  There, Ms. McLean
was given a blood test 30 to 45 minutes after driving, but a police criminalist testified
that, depending on the circumstances, Ms. McLean’s alcohol concentration could have
been under the limit when she was driving. Id. at 1307.  However, the trial court stated,
“When an individual is charged under the per se statute . . . the bottom line is the
chemical test . . . .” Id. at 1310.  As such, it “refused to consider whether the totality of
the evidence rebutted or supported the statutory presumption that McLean’s BAC at the
time of the test was no less than the BAC at the time of driving.” Id.
The court explained that “a mandatory conclusive presumption removes the
presumed element from the case after the State has proved the predicate facts giving
rise to the presumption.” Id. at 1309 (citation omitted).  As an example, it noted that, in
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the trial court “refused to submit the
issue of intent to the jury, ruling the felonious intent could be presumed from the
defendant’s taking of the property, which was undisputed.” Id. at 1309.  But the United
States Supreme Court wrote,
A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would
effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption
which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an
isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of
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its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an
assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically
establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In
either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and
which extends to every element of the crime.
Id. (emphasis added).
As such, McLean ultimately held that “[a]bsent the statutory presumption, the
testimony of the police criminalist and the evidence regarding McLean’s conduct at the
time of her arrest may have failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the BAC
at the time of driving was at least 0.10%.” Id. at 1310.  Therefore, “McLean’s
constitutional right to have the State prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt was violated by the conclusive presumption applied by the judge.” Id.
In this case, under Tomlinson’s interpretation of I.C. § 18-8004, Mr. Austin was
not allowed to produce evidence of his condition while driving, and therefore the statute
as applied imposed absolute liability and a mandatory conclusive presumption, which
also violated Mr. Austin’s right to have the State prove every element beyond a
reasonable doubt.  Moreover, Idaho has no window of time in which a test result above
the limit would be considered as prima facie evidence of a per se violation.  The test
result, even if the test was administered days afterwards, could be used to prosecute a
defendant.  In fact, here the district court asked the prosecutor what would happen if the
test was given two days after driving.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.48, Ls.9-12.)  The prosecutor said
that the lapse of time between the stop and the test is relevant to the weight to be given
the test result.  (Tr. Vol.1, p.48, L.23 – p.49, L.1.)  Later, the district court asked if there
was a time limit in which the test must be given and revisited the fact that it “could be
two days afterwards.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68, Ls.6-17.)  The prosecutor acknowledged that
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there was no time limit in Idaho, so “theoretically you could try to prosecute someone – I
seriously doubt that any prosecutor in his right mind would try that.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.68,
Ls.18-21.)  This statement indicates that if—as Tomlinson held—a defendant’s expert
testimony regarding his alcohol concentration at the time of driving is irrelevant, then the
statute can be arbitrarily enforced because prosecutors could make decisions on whom
to prosecute randomly.
Finally, much like the situation in Barud, the statute as interpreted by Tomlinson
and applied to this case has the potential to create confusion about what level of alcohol
concentration is prohibited because Mr. Austin could be prosecuted for having an
alcohol concentration that rises after driving but is below the limit while driving.  Under
I.C. § 18-8004, it is not prohibited conduct to test above the limit, regardless of the
timing. And as counsel for Mr. Austin argued, the DUI statute was “not so open ended
that simply a test within a period of time after driving is criminal conduct, which the
legislature would be allowed to do.”  (Tr. Vol.1, p.59, L.23 – p.60, L.1.)  Under the
Tomlinson dicta, however, the statute fails to give notice of what the prohibited conduct
is because the test result is all that matters.  Therefore, in theory, the acts of driving and
drinking could be days apart, but the prosecutor could still prosecute.  Thus, the statute
could be arbitrarily enforced as law enforcement and prosecutors could “pursue their
personal predilections.”  Moreover, under Tomlinson and Elias-Cruz, the State does not
need to prove that a defendant’s alcohol concentration was over the limit while driving,
and thus the statute is unnecessarily broad as it affects activity that has not been
declared unlawful—driving with an alcohol concentration below the limit. As such, as
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applied in this case, the statute was void for vagueness as applied and overbroad and
therefore violated Mr. Austin’s right to due process.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Austin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court’s order granting the State’s motion in limine, and order that the
district court admit expert testimony regarding his alcohol concentration when he was
driving at a new trial.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2017.
_________/s/________________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
35
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of May, 2017, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in
the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JUSTIN KEITH AUSTIN
4106 N TREDWELL PLACE
BOISE ID 83703
MICHAEL REARDON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
DANIEL W TAYLOR
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
RPA/eas
